
Faculty hiring and the spread of scientific ideas

Allison Morgan, Dimitrios Economou, Samuel Way, Aaron Clauset Building Better Epistemic Networks Workshop, Sept 5th 2019

Goals for this talk:

Quantify prestige in academia 1. 2. affects research progress Discuss implications 3.



Identify a structural mechanism for how prestige

Goals for this talk:

Quantify prestige in academia 1. 2. affects research progress 3. Discuss implications

Identify a structural mechanism for how prestige


35 Academic workforce



.....

Trajectories of individuals form a network






BA, Physics Reed College



PhD, Computer Science University of New Mexico



BS, Physics Haverford College MS, Computer Science University of Colorado

> PhD, Computer Science University of Colorado (실)


Assistant Professor University of Colorado

Fellow Santa Fe Institute

Associate Professor University of Colorado

Trajectories of individuals form a network







Reed College



PhD, Computer Science University of New Mexico




BS, Physics Haverford College MS, Computer Science University of Colorado



PhD, Computer Science University of Colorado (실)

Assistant Professor University of Colorado



Fellow Santa Fe Institute

Associate Professor University of Colorado

Faculty hiring networks

Each directed edge $u \rightarrow v$ PhD from $u \rightarrow$ faculty at v


[US academia: big, mobile, selfcontained, competitive]

Dramatic inequality in PhD production [80/20 rule holds]

Common large-scale structure: influential, well-connected core

Small percentage of edges are selfloops [8% in CS]

Assumption: reveals collective preferences. Hiring committees want to hire the best candidates



Computer science faculty hiring network; http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~aaronc/facultyhiring/



Quantifying prestige


Many rankings exist:

U.S. News & World Report, National Research Council, Princeton Review [U.S.] ...

But they often describe the inputs to the system, or don't reflect what universities truly think of each other.

Let's construct a ranking based on revealed university preferences through hiring.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/College_and_university_rankings





Quantifying prestige

Compute an average **Minimum Violation Rank** (MVR) to find an order of nodes (universities) that minimizes "upsets."


Select permutation (a ranking) π that minimizes the number of "rank violations": edges (*u*, *v*) where $\pi_v < \pi_u$

Higher-ranked universities have greater placement power.

Systematic inequality and hierarchy in faculty hiring networks

Aaron Clauset, 1,2,3* Samuel Arbesman, 4 Daniel B. Larremore 5,6

Science Advances 1(1), e1400005 (2015)






We can use these rankings to generate predictions for individuals and the system.

Consider the annual matching process of candidates to openings.

Each year *t*, has $\{u_t\}$ candidate "stubs" and $\{v\}_t$ opening "stubs."

Given a pair (u_i , v), the probability of matching depends on that pair's features $x[u_i, v]$.




We can use these rankings to generate predictions for individuals and the system.

Consider the annual matching process of candidates to openings.

Each year *t*, has $\{u_t\}$ candidate "stubs" and $\{v\}_t$ opening "stubs."

Given a pair (u_i , v), the probability of matching depends on that pair's features $x[u_i, v]$.




We can use these rankings to generate predictions for individuals and the system.

Consider the annual matching process of candidates to openings.

Each year *t*, has $\{u_t\}$ candidate "stubs" and $\{v\}_t$ opening "stubs."

Given a pair (u_i , v), the probability of matching depends on that pair's features $x[u_i, v]$.



We can use these rankings to generate predictions for individuals and the system.

Consider the annual matching process of candidates to openings.

Each year *t*, has $\{u_t\}$ candidate "stubs" and $\{v\}_t$ opening "stubs."

Given a pair (u_i, v) , the probability of matching depends on that pair's features $x[u_i, v]$.


The most important modeling features are differences in prestige and productivity.




Gender, Productivity, and Prestige in Computer Science Faculty Hiring Networks

Samuel F. Way,^{1,*} Daniel B. Larremore,^{2,†} and Aaron Clauset^{1,3,2,‡}

Proc. 25th Int'l World Wide Web Conf. (2016)







Features of hierarchy

systematic

90% of hiring movement is "down" the hierarchy


steep

< 7% of faculty have PhD from lower 75% of universities


biased

median change for women~3 ranks worse than men

http://danlarremore.com/faculty/ Explore the data for History, CS, Business



Core-periphery position changes with rank




What are the implications?

Shape of the faculty hiring network


Universities in the core are (obviously) very close to all other core universities.

Next: core position enables substantial influence over research **agendas**, research **communities**, and departmental **norms** throughout a discipline.




Shape of the faculty hiring network

- Large inequalities in placement power
- Faculty flow out of core, into periphery
- Modest fraction stays inside core
- Small fraction flows "upstream"
- Prestige describes influence via individuals placement
- **Next:** How does prestige affect science as a system?




Goals for this talk:

Quantifying prestige in academia 1. 2. affects research progress 3. Discuss implications



Identify a structural mechanism for how prestige





Science is a meritocracy... right?

1247

https://pxhere.com/en/photo/950021 (CC 2.0)

250



Some scientists and institutions are far more influential than others

The Matthew Effect in Science

The reward and communication systems of science are considered.

Alexander Michael Petersen^{a,1}, Santo Fortunato^{b,1}, Raj K. Pan^b, Kimmo Kaski^b, Orion Penner^c, Armando Rungi^a, Massimo Riccaboni^{c,d}, H. Eugene Stanley^{e,1}, and Fabio Pammolli^{a,e}

Science 159.3810, 56-63 (1968)

DEPARTMENTAL EFFECTS ON SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY*

PAUL D. ALLISON University of Pennsylvania

J. SCOTT LONG Indiana University

Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 469-478 (1990)

Robert K. Merton

Inputs, Outputs, and the Prestige of University Science Departments'

Warren O. Hagstrom University of Wisconsin

Sociol. Educ. 375-397 (1971)

Reputation and impact in academic careers

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A 111(43) 15316-15321(2014)

Publication, Power, and Patronage: On Inequality and Academic Publishing

Chad Wellmon and Andrew Piper¹

Critical Inquiry (2017)

Professional Standing and the Reception of Scientific Discoveries¹


Stephen Cole

State University of New York at Stony Brook, and Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University

Am. J. Soc. 76(2), 286-306 (1970)

Three explanations

- (1) genuine differences in merit
- (2) non-meritocratic social processes
- (3) non-meritocratic structural factors



https://www.olympic.org/news/1932-the-podium-makes-its-olympic-debut



Three explanations

- (1) genuine differences in merit
- (2) non-meritocratic social processes
- (3) <u>non-meritocratic structural</u> factors



https://www.olympic.org/news/1932-the-podium-makes-its-olympic-debut




R1: Are research ideas carried by faculty hiring?

R1: Are research ideas carried by faculty hiring?



W. Lamb, J. Wheeler, A. Pais, R. Feynman, H. Feshbach, J. Schwinger







R1: Are research ideas carried by faculty hiring?



W. Lamb, J. Wheeler, A. Pais, R. Feynman, H. Feshbach, J. Schwinger




Earliest published Feynman Diagram



R1: Are research ideas carried by faculty hiring?

R2: Does the structure of the faculty hiring network affect the spread of ideas?



Sci. Adv. 1(1), e1400005, 2015.

Data

Education & employment for 4,388 faculty from 205 U.S. and Canadian CS departments employed between 2011-2012


- Institution (node) u with unique prestige π
- Edge (*u*, *v*) represents a single PhD candidate

from u who got an assistant faculty position at v

Over 2M publication records for tenure-track faculty.

- Title, author list, venue, and date
- Matched with employment start dates

Faculty hiring networks



Science Advances 1(1), e1400005, 2015.

Publication records

		dblp computer science bibliography	
		Detecting Change Points in the Large-Scale Structure of Evolving Networks. AAA: 2015: 2914-2920	
[C6]	围 0, ඥ o¦	Leto Peel, Aaron Clauset: Predicting Sports Scoring Dynamics with Restoration and Anti-Persistence. ICDM 2015: 339-348	
019]	<u> 문 또 또</u>	Abigail Z. Jacobs, Samuel F. Way, Johan Ugander, Aaron Clauset: Assembling thefacebook: Using heterogeneity to understand online social network assembly. CoRR abs/1503.06772 (2015)	
🔲 [เาย]	🛛 77 et et	Leto Peel, Aaron Clauset: Predicting sports scoring dynamics with restoration and anti-persistence. CoRR abs/1504.05872 (2015)	
B 17]] 표 영 영	Amir Ghasemian, Pan Zhang, Aaron Clauset, Cristopher Moore, Leto Peel: Detectability thresholds and optimal algorithms for community structure in	

Proc. 25th Int'l World Wide Web Conf. (WWW), (2016)

Data

Education & employment for 4,388 faculty from 205 U.S. and Canadian CS departments employed between 2011-2012


- Institution (node) u with unique prestige π
- Edge (*u*, *v*) represents a single PhD candidate

from u who got an assistant faculty position at v

Over 2M publication records for tenure-track faculty.

- Title, author list, venue, and date
- Matched with employment start dates

Faculty hiring networks



Science Advances 1(1), e1400005, 2015.


Publication records

		dblp computer science bibliography	
		Detecting Change Points in the Large-Stale Structure of Evolving Networks. AAA: 2015; 2914-2920	
[C6]	圓 0, ඥ q ₀ ⁰	Leto Peel, Aaron Clauset: Predicting Sports Scoring Dynamics with Restoration and Anti-Persistence. ICDM 2015: 339-348	
019]	<u>⊫</u> ⊻⊄~°	Abigail Z. Jacobs, Samuel F. Way, Johan Ugander, Aaron Clauset: Assembling thefacebook: Using heterogeneity to understand online social network assembly. CoRR abs/1503.06772 (2015)	
[]18]	🛛 77 66 %	Leto Peel, Aaron Clauset: Predicting sports scoring dynamics with restoration and anti-persistence. CoRR abs/1504.05872 (2015)	
[]17]] ¹ (전 4 4	Amlr Ghasemian, Pan Zhang, Aaron Ciauset, Cristopher Moore, Leto Peel: Detectability thresholds and optimal algorithms for community structure in	


Proc. 25th Int'l World Wide Web Conf. (WWW), (2016)

For each department that has adopted a research idea, either:

For each department that has adopted a research idea, either:



Test: choose five research topics and evaluate the fraction of times those topics spread via (A) in real life, compared to the expected fraction under a permutation of publication titles



Test: choose five research topics and evaluate the fraction of times those topics spread via (A) in real life, compared to the expected fraction under a permutation of publication titles

Recover 241 spreading events for the five topics, each affecting between 11-58% of departments

- 88 (37%) of these happen by way of hiring

• 71 (81%) of those, move via from high to low prestige universities

Test: choose five research topics and evaluate the fraction of times those topics spread via (A) in real life, compared to the expected fraction under a permutation of publication titles

Research A

topic model

incremental con

quantum comp

mechanism de

deep learni


reas	
eling	
mputing	
outation	
lesign	
ing	X

Test: choose five research topics and evaluate the fraction of times those topics spread via (A) in real life, compared to the expected fraction under a permutation of publication titles


Research Areas

- topic modeling
- incremental computing
- quantum computation
 - mechanism design
 - deep learning

Faculty hiring acts as a mechanism for the spread of ideas, with differential effects by topic, across the computer science community



R2: Does the structure of the faculty hiring network affect the spread of ideas? To simulate the diffusion of ideas, use a **Susceptible-Infected** (SI) model.




Seed an epidemic at a university with unique prestige π , varying the transmissibility p (quality of an idea)

Quality of idea relates to how many nodes will adopt an idea (on average)

Measure the fraction of universities which adopted the idea

R2: Does the structure of the faculty hiring network affect the spread of ideas? To simulate the diffusion of ideas, use a **Susceptible-Infected** (SI) model.




Seed an epidemic at a university with unique prestige π , varying the transmissibility p (quality of an idea)

Quality of idea relates to how many nodes will adopt an idea (on average)

Measure the fraction of universities which adopted the idea


R2: Does the structure of the faculty hiring network affect the spread of ideas? To simulate the diffusion of ideas, use a **Susceptible-Infected** (SI) model.




Seed an epidemic at a university with unique prestige π , varying the transmissibility p (quality of an idea)


Quality of idea relates to how many nodes will adopt an idea (on average)

Measure the fraction of universities which adopted the idea





Remember: Core-periphery position changes with prestige





High Prestige ($\pi = 2.23$)






Medium Prestige ($\pi = 68.17$)


Low Prestige ($\pi = 130.66$)


Explore more simulations https://pikawolfy.github.io/epistemiclnequality/





High Prestige ($\pi = 2.23$)






Medium Prestige ($\pi = 68.17$)


Low Prestige ($\pi = 130.66$)

Explore more simulations https://pikawolfy.github.io/epistemiclnequality/







150



Infection Rate p ("Idea Quality")

- 0.1
- 0.3
- 0.5
- 0.7 • 0.9






* Assuming independence between quality of idea and origin; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meritocracy#Etymology


"Meritocracy"*

 Infection Rate <i>p</i> ("Idea Quality")
 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
0.9


150








Good ideas spread more easily from high-prestige universities




Great ideas can spread regardless of starting place



We may lose medium quality research ideas because the system structurally disallows their spread


Aside: What about other fields?



Gini coefficient for history is 0.72, business is 0.62, and computer science is 0.69.




Aside: What about other mechanisms?



Allowing a single jump to a disconnected node. Transmission probability is held constant at 0.1

> Jump Probability, q

- 0.10
- 0.30
- 0.50
- 0.70
- 0.90



Increasing Prestige

Good ideas can spread further and faster from prestigious universities, but great ideas can spread from any university.



Increasing Prestige

Good ideas can spread further and faster from prestigious universities, but great ideas can spread from any university.

So what?

Goals for this talk:

Quantifying prestige in academia 1. 2. affects research progress Discuss implications 3.

Identify a structural mechanism for how prestige

Conclusions

Ideas spread in academia via faculty hiring. The structure of this network can privilege elite institutions.

Caveats: Model assumes quality is independent of institution and hiring decisions.

To mitigate this, we could try to remove signals of prestige from our evaluations of quality (e.g., double-blind review).

Effectiveness of Anonymization in Double-Blind Review			
Claire Le Goues Carnegie Mellon University clegoues@cs.cmu.edu	Yuriy Brun University of Massachusetts Amherst brun@cs.umass.edu	Sven Apel University of Passau apel@uni-passau.de	
Emery Berger University of Massachusetts Amherst emery@cs.umass.edu	Sarfraz Khurshid University of Texas Austin khurshid@ece.utexas.edu	Yannis Smaragdakis University of Athens smaragd@di.uoa.gr	
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=3229066.3208157			

Systems which incentivize a large quantity of incremental ideas will tend promote the visibility of prestigious researchers.

Thought experiments: What if hiring was random? What if the lowest ranked universities chose first? What other non-meritocratic mechanisms might be at play? Could we validate these findings empirically?

The NIPS experiment

Dec 15, 2014 · Eric Price

http://blog.mrtz.org/2014/12/15/the-nips-experiment.html

Reviewer bias in single- versus double-blind peer review

Andrew Tomkins^{a,1}, Min Zhang^b, and William D. Heavlin^a

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. (2017)

Systematic inequality and hierarchy in faculty hiring networks

Aaron Clauset, 1,2,3* Samuel Arbesman, 4 Daniel B. Larremore 5,6

Science Advances 1(1), e1400005 (2015)


Collaborators: Dimitrios Economou, Samuel Way, Aaron Clauset, Daniel Larremore, McKenzie Mae Weller



Thanks!







Email: allison.morgan@colorado.edu **Twitter:** @alliecmorgan



University of Colorado **Boulder**



Prestige drives epistemic inequality in the diffusion of scientific ideas

Allison C. Morgan^{1*}, Dimitrios J. Economou¹, Samuel F. Way¹, and Aaron Clauset^{1,2,3}

EPJ Data Science 7:40 (2018)

Gender, Productivity, and Prestige in Computer Science Faculty Hiring Networks

Samuel F. Way,¹,^{*} Daniel B. Larremore,²,[†] and Aaron Clauset^{1,3,2},[‡]

Proc. 25th Int'l World Wide Web Conf. (2016)

Automatically assembling a full census of an academic field

Allison C. Morgan¹*, Samuel F. Way¹, Aaron Clauset^{1,2,3}

PLoS ONE 13(8): e0202223 (2018)

The misleading narrative of the canonical faculty productivity trajectory

Samuel F. Way^{a,1}, Allison C. Morgan^a, Aaron Clauset^{a,b,c,2}, and Daniel B. Larremore^{a,b,c,1,2}

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. (2017)

Productivity, prominence, and the effects of academic environment

Samuel F. Way^{a,1}, Allison C. Morgan^a, Daniel B. Larremore^{a,b,2}, and Aaron Clauset^{a,b,c,1,2}

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. (2019)



